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A RESPONSE
CASS R.  SUNSTEIN*
I am grateful to the editors of the Journal  for inviting me to reply to
Professor Chevigny's thoughtful response'  to my essay in these pages.2  I
find myself in agreement  with much of Professor Chevigny's argument.
A purely Cartesian account  of human thought would indeed be hard to
sustain.  Human  beings  do not approach  problems linearly  or through
propositions alone.  Drives, selective empathy and identification,  heuris-
tics  of various  sorts,  prior experience'and  beliefs,  desires,  recognizable
patterns, and various verbal and nonverbal cues also play a crucial role.
Moreover, much speech with noncognitive components is entitled to the
highest degree of constitutional protection.  Political speech, for example,
frequently  appeals to the heart as well as to the head.  The fact that an
appeal is emotionally loaded is hardly a good reason to allow the govern-
ment to control it.
Notwithstanding  these  points,  it  would,  I  think, be  a  mistake  to
abandon  the  view  that  some  narrowly  defined  categories  of speech-
threats,  involuntary  hypnosis,  and  most notably,  for present purposes,
pornography-merit less than the usual protection, and precisely because
of the  way  these  kinds  of speech  communicate  their  "message."  My
claim comes in two simple parts.  (1) Some narrowly drawn categories  of
speech  may  be regulated  on the basis  of a  lesser  showing  of harm-a
proposition that is in fact a staple  of current first amendment  doctrine.
(2) To decide whether speech falls  within those categories, it is relevant
whether the material in question appeals to cognitive or noncognitive ca-
pacities.  I arrive at this conclusion  through two different routes.
First:  I think Professor Chevigny overstates  his case.  The distinc-
tion between cognitive and noncognitive speech is not "dangerously inco-
herent."'3  Indeed,  Professor  Chevigny's  own  terms  suggest  that  he
believes that the distinction is intelligible, at least in the important sense
that it is possible  to identify polar cases.  For example,  he distinguishes
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between  "the  most professorial"  and  the  "most  'intuitive'  ,,;4 between
"propagandistic  persuasion"  and  other  kinds  of  thought;5  between
"prejudgments  ...  in patterns"  and "logic"; 6 between  "arous[al]"  and
"abstract"  argument.7  To  be  sure,  Professor  Chevigny  often  invokes
these distinctions  to  suggest that they are  less  crisp and clear  than  we
normally recognize-a  claim  I accept-but it is  hard to  read his  essay
without getting  the sense  that it  would  be difficult  indeed  to  proceed
without  distinctions  of  this  general  sort.  For  this  reason,  Professor
Chevigny's  colleague  is on to  something  true and important  when  she
says, in response to his essential argument, that what makes pornography
different  is that people  "get  off on it."  But more on this below.
More fundamentally,  the proposition that "our judgments  [appear]
'detached'  or contemplative, but they are as much rooted in our prejudg-
ments as are  snap decisions," 9 is not merely  a counsel of despair.  This
proposition-to which  I very much doubt Professor  Chevigny  entirely
subscribes-is also antithetical to the basic logic of a system of free  ex-
pression, which places a high premium on the process of discussion  and
deliberation among  people  with different  views.  If judgments, contem-
plative judgments, snap judgments, and prej.dgments  are essentially all
one, it will not be easy to specify the sorts of values our system of free
speech should serve.  Indeed,  common practices of deliberation, commu-
nication,  change in perspective,  and learning will be hard to sustain.
In any  case, Professor Chevigny's  effort  to collapse  the distinction
between the cognitive and noncognitive is emphatically not the lesson  of
the various writings on which he relies.  Those writings  convey no single
message, but make a variety of quite distinct claims, some of them funda-
mentally at odds  with Professor Chevigny's position.  Either separately
or together, they do not support Professor Chevigny's  effort to collapse
the distinction between  reasoned judgments and bare intuition. 1 0
4.  Id. at 424.
5.  Id. at 426.
6.  Id. at 428.
7.  Id. at 430.
8.  Id. at 428.
9.  Id. at 427; see also  id. at 426  ("We cannot escape from our stereotypes through 'rationality'
or 'detachment'  because  they  are  the  principal  tools  we have.").  The  same position-a  form  of
conventionalism--can  be found  in  S.  FISH,  DOING WHAT  COMES  NATURALLY  (1989);  it is criti-
cized in Sunstein, Interpreting  Statutes in the Regulatory  State, 103 HARV.  L. REV. - (forthcoming
1989).
10.  The various  writings by Tversky,  Kahneman,  and  others deal  principally  with  heuristics
that people  use in  evaluating probabilities.  JUDGMENT  UNDER  UNCERTAINTY:  HEURISTICS  AND
BIASES  (D.  Kahneman,  P. Slovic,  A. Tversky  eds.  1982).  Their goal  is to show  how rationality
breaks down, or is compromised, in different settings; they do not identify the snap decision with the
considered judgment,  or suggest that the cognitive/noncognitive  distinction  is incoherent.  Indeed,
the exact opposite is true:  the introduction  to the very volume on which Professor Chevigny relies
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An  effort  to  collapse  the  distinction  between  the  cognitive  and
noncognitive would also be wildly untrue to human experience, in which
prejudgments  and uninformed intuitions are subject to various  forms of
testing and reassessment during the process of making a decision." 1   The
most obvious examples here involve means-end rationality of the simplest
sort,  in  which  people  ask  themselves  whether  a  particular  course  of
action  will  in fact  produce  the goals  they  seek,  or  whether  there  are
superior  alternatives.  It  would  be  peculiar  to  denigrate  the  role  of
"logic"  here,  and  snap judgments  are  often reassessed.  Modern  social
science, moreover, has  provided  extremely  helpful information on such
issues.12  The cognitive testing of prejudgments  occurs  in other contexts
as  well.  Values  themselves  emerge  partly  through  a  process  of
deliberation.
All  this  suggests  that  the  distinction  between  the  cognitive  and
noncognitive is not incoherent;  we can distinguish between forms of ex-
pression based on their appeal to different capacities.  To say this is not
to deny that communication frequently involves noncognitive elements, 13
and it is not to claim that communication  is ever purely cognitive or that
the presence of noncognitive elements removes speech from first amend-
ment protection. 1 4  Indeed, the cognitive/noncognitive distinction should
arise only infrequently in first amendment cases, as in fact it does. 15  But
the question  remains  whether first  amendment  doctrine  ought to treat
some forms of speech-threats,  assaults, some pornography--differently
says that some such heuristics "lead  to severe and systematic errors." Id. at 3.  A considered judg-
ment necessarily  depends on a belief in logic, and that belief underlies  most of the modern work in
social  psychology  on  heuristics  and  biases.  See  also J.  ELSTER,  SOLOMONIC  JUDGMENTS  ch.  1
(1989)  (discussing breakdowns  in rationality).
I  cannot deal  with  Professor  Chevigny's various  other sources  in this  space, but  one of the
mistakes  in  his  analysis, I  think,  is to take  what  is an  essentially  descriptive  work about mental
processes-showing  various cognitive breakdowns  and complexities-as support for the quite differ-
ent claim that moral or constitutional theory ought not to distinguish between the cognitive and the
noncognitive, or  that such  a distinction is "incoherent."  Chevigny, supra note  1, at 422.
11.  See J. RAWLS,  A THEORY  OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1971)  (discussing reflective  equilibrium, the
state reached "after a person has weighed  various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his
judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding
conception)).  Education  in  general,  including  legal  education,  involves  precisely  these  sorts  of
processes.  See  M.  NUSSBAUM,  THE  FRAGILITY  OF  GOODNESS:  LuCK  AND  ETHICS  IN  GREEK
TRAGEDY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  (1985).
12.  Thus, for example, regulation of the environment and of occupational  safety and health-
not to mention  pornography-should  be based on  a careful  understanding  of the likely  effects  of
different  enforcement strategies.  See,  eg.,  Rose-Ackerman,  Progressive Law  and Economics-and
the New Administrative  Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341,  354-60 (1988)  (well-informed policy analysis demon-
strates that occupational safety and health regulations poorly achieve democratic government's goals
of redistribution  and aid to working people).
13.  See  Sunstein,  supra note 2, at 606 & n.101.
14.  Id. at  605-08.
15.  See,  eg.,  United  States v. O'Brien,  391  U.S.  367  (1967).
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from others because of the way they communicate their message;  and it is
to this question  to which I now  turn.
Second:  Those interpreting  the  first  amendment  must  distinguish
between  activities  that count as  "speech"  and those that  do not.  That
task is hard enough, but a system of free expression must also distinguish
between  speech  that  is  and  is  not  central  to the  purposes  of the free
speech guarantee.  This latter task-to set out categories of "low  value"
and "high value" expression-is crucial to modern  first amendment doc-
trine; indeed, judge-made  doctrine  could hardly function without it.16
Unless I misread him, Professor Chevigny's approach would make it
difficult  or  impossible  to  distinguish  between  activities  that  count  as
speech and activities that do not;  his approach also would make it hard
to distinguish between low- and high-value  speech.  I am confident that
Professor Chevigny would not claim that a long look at a rock formation,
a visit to a prostitute, or a summer vacation  in Paris, count as constitu-
tionally protected speech-but  all of these  activities are  subject  to pre-
cisely the  same sorts of mental  intermediation  that Professor Chevigny
treats as characteristic  to all forms of speech.  If so, Professor Chevigny
will be forced either to assimilate a quite dazzling range of activity to the
category  of constitutionally  protected  speech-an  implausible  innova-
tion, I think, on existing doctrine-or to rely on the discredited and un-
tenable distinction between  "speech"  and "conduct."' 7
In brief, the first amendment makes it necessary  to identify the dis-
tinctive characteristics  entitling "speech,"  and not other forms of human
experience,  to constitutional  protection.  Any  approach  that  refuses  to
undertake such a task will be at best incomplete and more likely a mud-
dle.  And any approach that does undertake this task will probably con-
clude  that  speech  is  protected  at  least  partly  because  it  involves
cognition.  In the public realm, cognition-understood to involve deliber-
ative capacities  of a  wide-ranging  sort-provides  a  central  clue  to  the
American  commitment  to self-government  through  political  processes;
and  it  is  here  that  a  central  purpose  of the  first  amendment  can  be
found.'  However  oversimplified  the  Enlightenment  understanding  of
16.  See  Sunstein, supra note 2,  at 602-05.
17.  There might be a third alternative here, but I am unable  to think of it.
18.  See, ag.,  A.  MEIKLEJOHN,  FREE  SPEECH  AND  ITS  RELATION  TO  SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948);  J. ELY,  DEMOCRACY  AND  DISTRUST  112  (1980)  (must minimize  assessment  of message's
danger  if first amendment  is  to serve its  central  function  of ensuring  open  political  process  and
dialogue).
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these problems might be, I remain unconvinced that a sensible system of
free expression  must treat violent pornography  in the same way that it
treats political speech, or the works of Albert Einstein.19
19.  Chevigny,  supra note  1, at 423-24.
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